Moorean absurdity and showing what's within

In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams, Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. New York: Oxford University Press (2007)
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Abstract

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Virginia and at Texas A&M University. I thank audiences at both institutions for their insightful comments. Special thanks to John Williams for his illuminating comments on an earlier draft. Research for this paper was supported in part by a Summer Grant from the Vice Provost for Research and Public Service at the University of Virginia. That support is here gratefully acknowledged.

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Mitchell Green
University of Connecticut

Citations of this work

Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.
Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2019 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.
Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.

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