Moorean pretense

In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. New York: Oxford University Press (2007)
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Robert Gordon
University of Missouri, St. Louis

Citations of this work

Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement.Adam Leite - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):150-171.

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