Abstract

In several dialogues, Plato praises and employs a method of "dividing according to forms." This method is used to prevent one kind of thing from being mistaken for another, and to clarify and define any subject of investigation. This dissertation offers a comprehensive account of division, including the rules which govern its operation, the implications it has for Plato's ontology, and its development from shorter applications in earlier dialogues to increasingly systematic, self-conscious and detailed uses in later dialogues. ;The dissertation argues that division does not produce a hierarchy of kinds, but instead traces an interwoven "network" of connections among kinds. The method implies no particular ontological priority among kinds, does not always move from the general to the particular, and may distinguish kinds which overlap in scope. The kinds identified by division are not necessarily determined by or contained within the scope of preceding kinds, nor must they bear the relationships of part and whole to one another. The same kind may be divided in different ways in different contexts, and the names assigned to kinds are not especially important. ;Kinds are distinguished from one another along "natural joints," which correspond to ontological distinctions in the universe. The same joints are used to justify multiple distinctions in different contexts, and successful divisions should appeal to such joints as the basis for making a legitimate distinction among kinds, as opposed to an arbitrary cut. The dialectician is able to identify any given kind as a unified kind insofar as some plurality shares a common capacity or power . Differences among kinds thus depend upon distinctions between their unique capacities; such distinctions are marked by the "natural joints" identified by the dialectician