- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Still Particular: A Reply to Ganson and Mehta
Abstract
We are grateful to Ganson and Mehta (forthcoming) for their reply to our defence of phenomenal particularism against the objections raised by Mehta in his (2014). Their reply clarifies the nature of their objections to phenomenal particularism and helps identify the locus of our disagreements. In what follows we aim to defend phenomenal particularism against the objections raised in their reply.Author Profiles
Craig French
Nottingham University
Anil Gomes
University of Oxford
Other Versions
No versions found
My notes
Similar books and articles
On the generality of experience: a reply to French and Gomes.Neil Mehta & Todd Ganson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3223-3229.
On the Particularity of Experience.Anil Gomes & Craig French - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):451-460.
The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience.Neil Mehta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (6):311-331.
Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Overlap.Jonathan Brink Morgan - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1243-1253.
What does phenomenal particularity commit us to?Rami Ali - 2024 - In Robert French & Berit Brogaard, The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception. Springer. pp. 275-291.
The phenomenal concept strategy.Peter Carruthers & Benedicte Veillet - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10):212-236.
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy and a Master Argument.Napoleon Mabaquiao Jr - 2015 - Kemanusiaan 22 (1):53-74.
In Defence of Particularism: A Reply to Stokes.Matthew R. X. Dentith - 2016 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (11):27-33.
Analytics
Added to PP
2016-05-15
Downloads
970 (#25,380)
6 months
124 (#51,587)
2016-05-15
Downloads
970 (#25,380)
6 months
124 (#51,587)
Historical graph of downloads
Author Profiles
Craig French
Nottingham University
Anil Gomes
University of Oxford
Citations of this work
What does phenomenal particularity commit us to?Rami Ali - 2024 - In Robert French & Berit Brogaard, The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception. Springer. pp. 275-291.
References found in this work
The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action.Matthew Soteriou - 2013 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Criteria, defeasibility, and knowledge.John McDowell - 1988 - In Jonathan Dancy, Perceptual knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 455-79.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-5b9ff6f457-cbsf4 uwo