Revelation, Consciousness+ and the Phenomenal Powers View

Topoi 39 (5):1089-1092 (2020)
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Abstract

Revelation is roughly the thesis that we have introspective access to the essential nature of our conscious states. This thesis is appealed to in arguments against physicalism. Little attention has been given to the problem that Revelation is a source of pressure in the direction of epiphenomenalism, as introspection does not seem to reveal our conscious states as being essentially causal. I critique Hedda Hassel Mørch’s ‘phenomenal powers view’ response to this difficulty, before defending a form of the ‘consciousness+’ response.

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Philip Goff
Durham University

Citations of this work

A Humean Non-Humeanism.David Builes - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):1031-1048.
The Ineffability of Induction.David Builes - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):129-149.

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References found in this work

New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.
New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver, Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
Combining Minds: How to Think about Composite Subjectivity.Luke Roelofs - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
The evolutionary argument for phenomenal powers.Hedda Hassel Morch - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):293-316.

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