Consciousness and Fundamental Reality

New York, USA: Oup Usa (2017)
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Abstract

The first half of this book argues that physicalism cannot account for consciousness, and hence cannot be true. The second half explores and defends Russellian monism, a radical alternative to both physicalism and dualism. The view that emerges combines panpsychism with the view that the universe as a whole is fundamental.

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Philip Goff
Durham University

Citations of this work

The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.
Metaphysical grounding.Ricki Bliss & Kelly Trogdon - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Combination Problem for Panpsychism.David Chalmers - 2017 - In Brüntrup Godehard & Jaskolla Ludwig, Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
Panpsychism.William E. Seager, Philip Goff & Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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