Various Contexts of the Idea of Human Dignity

Filozofia 59:69-74 (2004)
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Abstract

Prominent critics of consequentialism hold that utilitarianism is not capable of accepting authentic human values, because the consequentialist viewpoint is impersonal. According to it consequentialist rationality has no axiological limits and it can think about doing the unthinkable. The main objective of the paper is to show that human dignity has a significant position in the author's conception of ethics of social consequences (a non-utilitarian consequentialism) arguing for a particular theory of the value of human dignity. The author argues that the ethics of social consequences is capable of accepting human dignity as well as all authentic human moral values. He believes that ethical theory of social consequences (as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism) can provide the element missing whose lack was unveiled by the critics of utilitarianism.

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Vasil Gluchman
Comenius University In Bratislava (Doctorate)

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References found in this work

Freedom as antipower.Philip Pettit - 1996 - Ethics 106 (3):576-604.
Utilitarianism and the Virtues.Philippa Foot - 1983 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 57 (2):273-283.
Rights, Constraints and Trumps.Philip Pettit - 1987 - Analysis 47 (1):8 - 14.

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