The machine basis for the Dasein: On the prospects for an existential functionalism [Book Review]

Man and World 19 (1):55-72 (1986)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Heidegger has provided a profound account of human existence in terms of the to-be-da. Even though Heidegger disregarded its brain machine basis (and even though brain scientists disregard Heidegger), the issue of the Dasein's machine basis is raised by the empirically extremely well confirmed “supervenience” of the Dasein on the brain. Since the Turing machine will not do as basis for the Dasein, as Dreyfus has shown, contemporary functionalism cannot resolve the issue. Instead an “existential functionalism,” which looks to some other kind of machine than the computer, is called for. A machine that continuously tunes filters on input and that detects any match between abstract properties of the input flux and filter specifications was considered. A match points to those tuning rules whose abstract conditions have been satisfied by input, and the rules thus selected are enabled to generate their own fulfillment through mechanisms that can presently be only speculated about. Such a machine cannot sustain direct perception but is “methodologically solipsistic.” At the most general level of description, the wet machine that provides a supervenience base for the Dasein is to be considered a “windowless monad.”

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,667

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-01-25

Downloads
46 (#484,816)

6 months
9 (#504,609)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gordon Globus
University of California at Irvine

Citations of this work

Derrida and connectionism: Differance in neural nets.Gordon G. Globus - 1992 - Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):183-97.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2001 - In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Weak supervenience.John Haugeland - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1):93-103.
Antibodies and learning: Selection versus instruction.Niels Kaj Jerne - 1994 - In H. Gutfreund & G. Toulouse (eds.), Biology and Computation: A Physicist's Choice. World Scientific. pp. 278.

Add more references