Making Sense of Self Talk

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):271-285 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

People talk not only to others but also to themselves. The self talk we engage in may be overt or covert, and is associated with a variety of higher mental functions, including reasoning, problem solving, planning and plan execution, attention, and motivation. When talking to herself, a speaker takes devices from her mother tongue, originally designed for interpersonal communication, and employs them to communicate with herself. But what could it even mean to communicate with oneself? To answer that question, we need a theory of communication that explains how the same linguistic devices may be used to communicate with others and oneself. On the received view, which defines communication as information exchange, self talk appears to be an anomaly, for it is hard to see the point of exchanging information with oneself. However, if communication is analysed as a way of negotiating commitments between speaker and hearer, then communication may be useful even when speaker and hearer coincide. Thus a commitment-based approach allows us to make sense of self talk as well as social talk.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,026

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The self and self‐reference.P. M. S. Hacker - 1990 - In Wittgenstein, meaning and mind. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. pp. 245–265.
Conventions and Failure of Communication.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2010 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 43 (1):1-14.
Self-talk and Self-awareness: On the Nature of the Relation.Alain Morin - 1993 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (3):223-234.
Why Do We Talk To Ourselves?Felicity Deamer - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):425-433.
Can Robots Learn to Talk?Lars Hertzberg - 2019 - In A. C. Grayling, Shyam Wuppuluri, Christopher Norris, Nikolay Milkov, Oskari Kuusela, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Beth Savickey, Jonathan Beale, Duncan Pritchard, Annalisa Coliva, Jakub Mácha, David R. Cerbone, Paul Horwich, Michael Nedo, Gregory Landini, Pascal Zambito, Yoshihiro Maruyama, Chon Tejedor, Susan G. Sterrett, Carlo Penco, Susan Edwards-Mckie, Lars Hertzberg, Edward Witherspoon, Michel ter Hark, Paul F. Snowdon, Rupert Read, Nana Last, Ilse Somavilla & Freeman Dyson, Wittgensteinian : Looking at the World From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 409-422.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-12-28

Downloads
88 (#252,118)

6 months
10 (#364,017)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Bart Geurts
Radboud University Nijmegen

References found in this work

How to do things with words.John L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gricean Communication and Cognitive Development.Richard Moore - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):pqw049.

View all 17 references / Add more references