What is the Structure of Self-Consciousness and Conscious Mental States?

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):295-309 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I believe that there is a ubiquitous pre-reflective self-awareness accompanying first-order conscious states. However, I do not think that such self-awareness is itself typically conscious. On my view, conscious self-awareness enters the picture during what is sometimes called “introspection” which is a more sophisticated form of self-consciousness. I argue that there is a very close connection between consciousness and self-consciousness and, more specifically, between the structure of all conscious states and self-consciousness partly based on the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. A plausible notion of self-consciousness is, I think, simply having any degree of higher-order or meta-psychological thought. I argue that the connection between conscious states and self-consciousness is representational but also critically evaluate several different options. I then critique the alternative “acquaintance” theory of self-awareness and address a couple of recent criticisms of HOT theory. There is the potential danger of misrepresentation between self-awareness and conscious states which I also briefly address.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 102,394

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function.David Rosenthal - 2012 - Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
Addressing Higher-Order Misrepresentation with Quotational Thought.Vincent Picciuto - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):109-136.
Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (1):73-89.
In Defence of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: The Heidelberg View.Manfred Frank - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):277-293.
The 'of' of intentionality and the 'of' of acquaintance.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2015 - In Sofia Miguens, Gerhard Preyer & Clara Bravo Morando (eds.), Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 317-341.
Consciousness and Self-awareness—an Alternative Perspective.Robert Van Gulick - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):329-340.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-06-16

Downloads
98 (#218,902)

6 months
25 (#127,006)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Rocco J. Gennaro
University of Southern Indiana

Citations of this work

Against an Epistemic Argument for Mineness.Shao-Pu Kang - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

View all 55 references / Add more references