La période intermédiaire de Wittgenstein

Philosophiques 39 (1):57 (2012)
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Abstract

Les Remarques philosophiques sont la première tentative de mettre en oeuvre le programme qui découle de l’échec du projet du Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Le noyau de ce programme est donné par l’abandon de l’analyse des nombres avancée dans le Tractatus. Wittgenstein se rend compte que les nombres doivent se trouver à la base même du langage, dans la structure des propositions élémentaires. En même temps, il se rend compte qu’il est impossible de fournir la logique sousjacente au langage avant d’avoir procédé à l’analyse. Le projet d’une investigation logique des phénomènes s’imposait, donc, même après l’abandon de l’idée d’un langage phénoménologique. The Philosophical Remarks is a first attempt at pursuing the philosophical agenda determined by the failure of the Tractarian project. The central point of this agenda is the abandonment of the analysis of number that had been given in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein realizes that numbers should be brought back to the basis of language, as part of the structure of the elementary propositions themselves. At the same time, he realizes that it is impossible to give the logic underlying our language before the process of logical analysis is carried out. He undertakes the project of a logical investigation of phenomena even after giving up the idea of a phenomenological language.

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Author Profiles

Bento Prado Neto
Universidade Federal de São Carlos
Joao Vergílio Cuter Gallerani
University of São Paulo

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References found in this work

The Analysis of Sensations.Ernst Mach - 1959 - Dover Publications.
Mind, Value, and Reality.John Mcdowell - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):242-249.
Insight and illusion: themes in the philosophy of Wittgenstein.Peter Michael Stephan Hacker - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Constantine Sandis.

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