The Geach‐Kaplan sentence reconsidered

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):288-314 (2023)
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Abstract

The Geach‐Kaplan sentence is alleged to be an example of a non‐first‐orderizable sentence, and the proof of the alleged non‐first‐orderizability is credited to David Kaplan. However, there is also a widely shared intuition that the Geach‐Kaplan sentence is still first‐orderizable by invoking sets or other extra non‐logical resources. The plausibility of this intuition is particularly crucial for first‐orderism, namely, the thesis that all our scientific discourse and reasoning can be adequately formalized by first‐order logic. I first argue that the Geach‐Kaplan sentence is, in fact, not first‐orderizable even by invoking extra non‐logical resources, in any sense that is acceptable for first‐orderism and adequately corresponds to the sense in which the Geach‐Kaplan sentence is deemed to be non‐first‐orderizable simpliciter via Kaplan's proof. To address this problem on behalf of first‐orderism, I then propose an alternative conception of first‐orderizability in the sense of which the Geach‐Kaplan sentence and any other second‐order sentences become first‐orderizable by invoking extra non‐logical resources; furthermore, in certain circumstances, they are first‐orderizable without incurring any extra ontological commitment. My analysis also turns out to yield (as a biproduct) a significant enhancement of the so‐called paradox of plurality.

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Kentaro Fujimoto
University of Bristol

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Everything.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):415–465.
Nominalist platonism.George Boolos - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (3):327-344.
Ontology and ideology.W. V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Studies 2 (1):11 - 15.

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