The Disjunction and Existence Properties for Axiomatic Systems of Truth

Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 40 (1):1--10 (1987)
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Abstract

In a language for arithmetic with a predicate T, intended to mean “ x is the Gödel number of a true sentence”, a set S of axioms and rules of inference has the truth disjunction property if whenever S ⊢ T ∨ T, either S ⊢ T or S ⊢ T. Similarly, S has the truth existence property if whenever S ⊢ ∃χ T ), there is some n such that S ⊢ T ). Continuing previous work, we establish whether these properties hold or fail for a large collection of possible axiomatic systems.

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Citations of this work

Axiomatizing Kripke’s Theory of Truth.Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten - 2006 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.
Self-reference and the languages of arithmetic.Richard Heck - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (1):1-29.
A Liar Paradox.Richard G. Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):36-40.
Truth, reflection, and hierarchies.Michael Glanzberg - 2005 - Synthese 142 (3):289 - 315.
Field’s logic of truth.Vann McGee - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):421-432.

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References found in this work

An Axiomatic Approach to Self-Referential Truth.Harvey Friedman & Michael Sheard - 1987 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 33 (1):1--21.

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