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Making explicit 3-year-olds' implicit competence with their own false beliefs
Cognition 56 (1):31-60 (1995)
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Citations of this work
Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind.Paul Bloom - 2000 - Cognition 77 (1):25-31.
Constructing an understanding of mind: The development of children's social understanding within social interaction.Jeremy I. M. Carpendale & Charlie Lewis - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):79-96.
Solving belief problems: toward a task analysis.Daniel Roth & Alan M. Leslie - 1998 - Cognition 66 (1):1-31.
Don’t Mention the Marble! The Role of Attentional Processes in False-Belief Tasks.Paula Rubio-Fernández & Bart Geurts - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):835-850.
References found in this work
Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind.".Alan M. Leslie - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (4):412-426.
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
Domain specificity in conceptual development: Neuropsychological evidence from autism.Alan M. Leslie & Laila Thaiss - 1992 - Cognition 43 (3):225-251.
Children's early understanding of false belief.Peter Mitchell & Hazel Lacohée - 1991 - Cognition 39 (2):107-127.
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