Abstract

In this dissertation I create a model of compassion cast as a neo-Aristotelian virtue. In chapter one, I critically examine various understandings of compassion offered by Western philosophers. I identify critical objections to compassion with which any advocate of compassion must wrestle. Further, I argue that problematic components remain in conceptions of compassion offered by its advocates; for instance, I reject the claim that compassion must be painful and sorrowful. In chapter two, I create a three-way distinction between the emotion of pity, the emotion of compassion, and compassion understood as a neo-Aristotelian virtue. I argue that compassion is better understood as---and when it meets all the criteria of---a neo-Aristotelian virtue. However, Western understandings of the virtue of compassion still cannot overcome its painfulness. This problem is significant; given the ubiquity of suffering the compassionate agent may become overwhelmed, laden with pain and anguish, and thus unable to flourish. In chapter three I utilize a Buddhist understanding of compassion grounded in equanimity in order to solve the problem of the potential painfulness of the virtue of compassion. I argue that equanimity results in an active engagement coupled with a non-reactive attitude to events that transpire, rather than in passivity or indifference. I explore the ways that the development of compassion grounded in equanimity represents and achievement on the part of the agent who has diligently attended to habituating the proper emotions. In chapter four, I complete my model by inserting the description of compassion grounded in equanimity adopted from Buddhism into a neo-Aristotelian framework. I argue that the virtue of equanimitous compassion enables the agent to attend to suffering without jeopardizing her or his own flourishing. Further, this understanding of compassion successfully overcomes the objections offered by Nietzsche and Arendt. In chapter five I compare the score and implications of the work done by care ethicists with the model of compassion I have constructed. I demonstrate that my model of compassion better equips agents to respond to the suffering of near and distant strangers than models of care proposed by care ethicists