Consciousness

Abstract

This book deals with the nature of consciousness. Many philosophers and psychologists today believe that the mind is a physical phenomenon, whose processes can be explained in scientific terms. Consciousness presents the biggest challenge to this view. Can the physical sciences really explain the nature of conscious experience—the way it feels to have a throbbing headache, or see a sunset, or smell freshly ground coffee? Or is there more to these experiences than a physical account can ever capture? If consciousness is non-physical, then it is hard to see how it can have effects within the physical world. But if it is physical, then why does it seem so different from other physical phenomena? And what physical processes does it involve? Is the feel of a conscious experience just a matter of what it represents? Does consciousness involve a form of inner awareness? Finally, could it be that our view of consciousness is mistaken? Do we need to rethink some of our fundamental assumptions about it? These questions go to the heart of our conception of ourselves and our place in the universe, and are the subject of vigorous debate among contemporary philosophers

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,225

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

What is consciousness?David Carmel & Mark Sprevak - 2014 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 103-122.
A Role for Consciousness.David Hodgson - 2008 - Philosophy Now 65:22-24.
Some Reasons not to be Internalistic about the Physical Correlates of Consciousness.Cristina Amoretti - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 59:3-7.
Consciousness and the Insignificance of Materialism.Max Emil Deutsch - 2001 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-01-19

Downloads
23 (#939,354)

6 months
4 (#1,247,093)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Keith Frankish
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references