Abstract

Among philosophers and scientists it is widely recognized that conscious experience somehow arises from a physical basis, but there is no explanation or agreement of why and how it so arises. There are at least two issues worthy of further analysis. First, how do physical processes give rise to a rich inner life? Second, where and when does phenomenal experience take place? Or, what is the physical locus of conscious experience? In this paper we will limit ourselves to examine the latter issue arguing against the widespread assumption that conscious experience is the result of some yet-to-be-defined activity taking place inside the brain or the central nervous system. We will show that the brain/CNS is necessary but not sufficient for conscious experience and that there is no match between the content of a neural representational system and the content of related experience. We will also claim that these two desiderata can be met by an externalist conception of the physical correlates of consciousness. We will, thus, advance the thesis that conscious experiences are realized by physical processes extended in space and time, originating in the environment and ending in the brain, that is, by processes partially external to the brain/CNS.