Mill's Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill's Notorious Proof

Amsterdam and Atlanta: Brill | Rodopi (1994)
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Abstract

Mill’s Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill’s Notorious Proof is a defense of John Stuart Mill’s proof of the principle of utility in the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism. The proof is notorious as an allegedly fallacious attempt by a prominent philosopher who ought not to have made the elementary mistakes he is supposed to have made. This book shows that he did not. The aim is neither to glorify utilitarianism as a normative ethical theory nor to vindicate Mill’s universalistic ethical hedonism as the best form of utilitarianism. The book is devoted primarily to demonstrating that Mill successfully defends what he sets out to establish in his proof of the principle of utility. Much of the discussion is geared toward absolving Mill of the various fallacies with which he has been saddled.

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Necip Fikri Alican
Washington University in St. Louis (PhD)

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References found in this work

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How to derive "ought" from "is".John R. Searle - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (1):43-58.
The naturalistic fallacy.W. K. Frankena - 1939 - Mind 48 (192):464-477.

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