Retributive Justice

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):365 - 368 (1972)
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Abstract

Retributivists who proclaim our moral obligation to punish criminals have displayed, on their own behalf, a type of argumant which I shall call Moral Balance. There are three versions of Moral Balance. According to Moral Balance I, retaliatory punishment restores the equality disturbed by the criminal. Moral Balance II philosophers admire the proportion between morality and welfare which punishment can yield. Those who hold with Moral Balance Ill are fascinated by the equilibrium of social benefits and burdens set by punishment. All three versions are flawed as follows: they imply that crime is morally justified.Moral Balance 1: EqualityHegel informs us that:his is the action of a rational being and this implies that it is something universal and that by doing it the criminal has laid down a law which he has explicitly recognized in his action and under which in consequence he should be brought as under his right.

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Author's Profile

Gertrude Ezorsky
PhD: New York University; Last affiliation: CUNY Graduate Center

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Persons and punishment.Herbert Morris - 1968 - The Monist 52 (4):475–501.

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