Aesthetic Properties, Mind-Independence, and Companions in Guilt

In Christopher Cowie & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge (2019)
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Abstract

I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons.

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Daan Evers
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

Consciousness is Sublime.Takuya Niikawa - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
Cavendish’s Aesthetic Realism.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (15):1-17.

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References found in this work

Of the Standard of Taste.David Hume - 1985 - Liberty Fund. Edited by E. Miller.
Relativism and disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Of the standard of taste.David Hume - 1875 - In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Indianapolis: Liberty Press. pp. 226-249.
Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.

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