Abstract

This dissertation addresses the problem of resolving ethical disagreements while admitting the formal coherence and consistency of the overall belief systems of the parties involved. How do we find ways to apply legitimate ethical pressure to a coherent, consistent ethical dissenter? ;Chapter One introduces this question, borrowing from Aristotle, and mentions the various questions that will be addressed in the subsequent chapters. ;Chapter Two addresses the question of an overall rejection of 'morality' and argues that such a rejection may be motivationally sound but does not serve to free individuals of moral conclusions that they have recognized for themselves. ;Chapter Three focuses on two thinkers, David Brink and Allan Gibbard, and examines how they seek to solve the question of legitimate ethical pressure in the face of coherent normative dissent. Neither offers a good way to solve the problem, or so I argue, but Gibbard in particular focuses attention on a possible positive solution. Namely, by examining conditions of normative competence there is hope that some criterial way of judging between equally coherent positions may fall out. ;Chapter Four expands on this point. There I seek to associate normative competence with sufficient impartiality. I set this view off from 'ideal' observer theories and argue for its possibility and usefulness in the face of criticisms leveled by Richard Rorty. ;Chapter Five briefly examines the theoretical underpinnings of the claim that coherent alternative ethical positions are possible--broadening the topic--and examines various alternative solutions to the same problem. Also in this chapter I address the gains made, pointing out the limits of my findings and places where I think the impartiality criterion can and cannot help move ethical debate forward