Abstract

One of the more controversial articles published in the philosophy of criticism during the past twenty-five years is “The Intentional Fallacy” by W. K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe Beardsley. Scholars from a variety of disciplines have expended a lot of energy in attacking and defending the Wimsatt-Beardsley position. Their efforts fall mainly into two classes. Either they have been exploratory with respect to the nature of the concept ‘intention’, but so exploratory as to present no tangible discovery; or they have merely been occasions to air the author’s own views, views which take sides, but views which in the end only serve to define what positions may be taken without really convincing anyone whether one position is clearly better than the other. This dilemma is really rather odd because in a certain sense it is pitifully easy to understand what the intentional fallacy amounts to. There is a kind of minimal meaning to it, and I suspect that introductory students in courses in Aesthetics and Criticism have little difficulty in understanding it. ‘Difficulties’ seem to arise primarily in connection with its implications and general scope within the totality of criticism. However, it would be wrong to conclude that these difficulties have nothing to do with the intentional fallacy. They do. And the reason is this: the way in which one argues for, that is, establishes, the intentional fallacy has much to do with its implications and general scope within the realm of criticism.