Abstract

I examine, in this dissertation, Monroe Beardsley's arguments against intentionalism . In particular, I explicate Beardsley's arguments in "The Intentional Fallacy," Aesthetics, and "Intentions and Interpretations: A Fallacy Revived." ;In "The Intentional Fallacy," Beardsley offer a logical argument against intentionalism based on several axiomatic propositions. In Aesthetics, Beardsley offers a phenomenological argument against authors' intentions. Both arguments are based on the ontological nature of artworks. I analyze these arguments and show them to be inadequate to advance his anti-intentionalistic conclusion. ;In "Intentions and Interpretations: A Fallacy Revived," Beardsley attacks intentionalism, concentrating less on the status of the work of art as an objective unity and more on the nature of speech-acts. He argues that the artist's intention cannot be used for interpretation because the text symbolizes a fictional representation of a speech-act. I examine the reasons behind this argument as well as the consequences of this shift. I demonstrate that the arguments Beardsley raises are not adequate to defeat intentionalism. ;I next explore the awkward gap that exists between Beardsley's ontological arguments against intentionalism and the reasons for those arguments. I claim that the phenomenological theory of Karl Duncker provides the backings and warrants implicit in Beardsley's theory. I show, furthermore, that Beardsley's thesis, even when buttressed by these presuppositions, is still inadequate to counter the intentionalists' position. ;Finally, I contrast Beardsley's conspicuously anti-intentionalist views with E. D. Hirsch's conspicuously pro-intentionalist views. I argue, nowithstanding some theoretical differences, that Beardsley's aesthetic theory regarding the use of intentions in interpretation is strikingly similar to Hirsch's position. I claim that what has been taken as commonplace, namely, contrasting Beardsley's views with Hirsch's, is a mistake. I show that Beardsley and Hirsch have much more in common than popular opinion acknowledges