Bağlam Rasyonalizmi ve Bilimde İlerleme

Felsefe Tartismalari 33:69-80 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Historically, those who defend the idea that there is a progress in science have been the ones who defend the view that science is a rational and objective activity. For those who do not think that science is an objective activity it is not meaningful to talk about theoretical and conceptual progress in science. What is meant by a “theoretical and conceptual progress”? If the succeeding theory performs better than the previous theory in explanations and predictions, then we can say that the succeeding theory has made a conceptual progress over the previous theory. In this paper, I argue that to show that science is a rational and objective activity we have to show that theory choice in science is an objective and rational activity. However, showing that theory choice is rational and objective forces us to relativize theory choice to a certain time. This puts scientific progress in front of us as a problem to be explained

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,757

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Two dogmas of methodology.Larry Laudan - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (4):585-597.
Das problem der theorienbewertung.Gerard Radnitzky - 1979 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 10 (1):67-97.
Rational Choice and Moral Theory.Edward F. McClennen - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):521-540.
Some Remarks on Laudan’s Theory of Scientific Rationality.Barbara von Eckardt - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:153-167.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-22

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references