Discrimination and Disrespect

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK (2015)
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Abstract

Hardly anyone disputes that discrimination can be a grave moral wrong. Yet this consensus masks fundamental disagreements about what makes something discrimination, as well as precisely why acts of discrimination are wrong. Benjamin Eidelson develops systematic answers to those two questions. He claims that discrimination is a form of differential treatment distinguished by its special connection to the differential ascription of some property to different people, and goes on to argue that what makes some cases of discrimination intrinsically wrongful is that they manifest an attitude of disrespect for the personhood of those who are disfavored. He endeavors to specify what this attitude consists in, and to demonstrate how attending to its character can help us to better understand the moral dimensions of different forms of wrongful discrimination. The book concludes with an extended discussion of racial profiling in law enforcement.

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Citations of this work

On statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness.Brian Hedden - 2021 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 49 (2):209-231.
Discrimination.Andrew Altman - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Failing to Treat Persons as Individuals.Erin Beeghly - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.

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