Abstract

This dissertation identifies and assesses three criteria that are often used to evaluate consequentialist theories of morality and rationality. After introducing a distinction between straightforwardly maximizing consequentialist theories and indirectly maximizing consequentialist theories , it addresses criteria associated with the concepts of self-defeat, the publicity condition, and incoherence. It argues that the thesis that the self-defeat of a normative theory is a good reason for rejecting it has several surprising and intolerable implications, the publicity condition is an unreasonably demanding requirement to impose on normative theories, and unlike self-defeat and publicity, the issue of incoherence is crucial to the viability of a normative theory; consequently, the incoherence of indirectly maximizing theories renders them unacceptable as accounts of moral or rational action. Although each of these conclusions is of independent interest, they are of further interest when considered together. For cumulatively they constitute a vigorous defense of straightforwardly maximizing theories and a sharp indictment of their indirectly maximizing rivals. As a result, the dissertation has direct implications for debates in both normative ethics and rational-choice theory