Forever is a day: Supertasks in Pitowsky and Malament-Hogarth spacetimes

Philosophy of Science 60 (1):22-42 (1993)
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Abstract

The standard theory of computation excludes computations whose completion requires an infinite number of steps. Malament-Hogarth spacetimes admit observers whose pasts contain entire future-directed, timelike half-curves of infinite proper length. We investigate the physical properties of these spacetimes and ask whether they and other spacetimes allow the observer to know the outcome of a computation with infinitely many steps

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Author Profiles

John Earman
University of Pittsburgh
John D. Norton
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Infinite Reasoning.Jared Warren - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):385-407.
Computation in physical systems.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Philosophy of Mathematics.Paul Benacerraf & Hilary Putnam - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):488-489.
Tasks and Supertasks.James Thomson - 1954 - Analysis 15 (1):1--13.
Tasks, super-tasks, and the modern eleatics.Paul Benacerraf - 1962 - Journal of Philosophy 59 (24):765-784.
The gravitational red shift as a test of general relativity: History and analysis.John Earman & Clark Glymour - 1980 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 11 (3):175-214.

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