Abstract

In my dissertation I explore the tension between self-acceptance and moral ideals, between accepting ourselves as we actually are and pursuing moral ideals. I approach this tension as a philosophical problem to investigate, not primarily by doing conceptual analysis , but by trying to articulate the personal and social meaning of the tension and by trying to point out possibilities of change. To begin with, I try to convey a sense of this tension and to show how it arises from conflicting norms and practices in our culture. I focus special attention on the practice of imposing demands on ourselves and of accepting demands that are imposed on us. I examine the connection between this practice and the self-reactive and self-critical attitude of guilt. At this point I discuss Freud's account of guilt as a tension within us, the tension between our superego demands and our actual desires. I also discuss Strawson's account of the connection between imposing demands on ourselves and developing self-reactive attitudes. Then I consider the view that self-reactive attitudes constitute our moral sense, that without these attitudes we would be sociopaths. I consider whether it would be possible to cultivate a detachment from the self-reactive attitudes that are based on demands and still find ways to constitute ourselves as moral subjects. Drawing on ideas from Dewey, Foucault, and Rorty, I then discuss the possibility of changing our current practices and attitudes. I suggest that we could try to constitute ourselves as moral subjects by practicing a kind of hermeneutics of the self, and I argue that in order to better interpret ourselves we sometimes need to cultivate a detachment from self-reactive attitudes. I suggest that by trying to realize more of the meaning of ourselves, and of the world, and by employing that meaning in action we could constitute ourselves as moral subjects and differentiate ourselves from sociopaths