What's my motivation? Reputational motives, virtue signaling, and self-directed mindshaping

Philosophical Psychology (2025)
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Abstract

In engaging in public moral discourse and publicly visible moral behavior, our motivations can be mixed: while on the one hand we might want to genuinely commit to norms we find morally virtuous, we can also be strongly motivated by enhancing our reputation. At times, we might even be accused of “virtue signaling”, that is, of engaging in moral discourse for self-aggrandizing and reputational gains. We might consider these reputational motives as a barrier to moral progress. In this paper, I rely on insights from norm psychology and on the mindshaping framework to suggest that our reputation-guided behavior can, in some instances, actively change us for the better. In particular, I argue that by adhering to social myths in a reputationally motivated way, we might end up exercising self-directed mindshaping, and change the way we see ourselves, the stories we tell about our ourselves, and how we behave.

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Leda Berio
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

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References found in this work

Moral Grandstanding.Justin Tosi & Brandon Warmke - 2016 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 44 (3):197-217.
Virtue Signaling and Moral Progress.Evan Westra - 2021 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 49 (2):156-178.
Metalinguistic Negotiation and Speaker Error.David Plunkett & Tim Sundell - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (1-2):142-167.
Virtue signalling is virtuous.Neil Levy - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9545-9562.

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