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Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24 (1):1-37 (2004)
Abstract
Several years ago I prepared a point-by-point response to this postscript as a working paper for the NYU Colloquium in Legal, Moral and Political Philosophy. I have not yet published that paper, but I understand that copies of it are in circulation. I do not intend to recapitulate the arguments of that working paper, but instead to concentrate on one aspect of Hart's Postscript, which is his defence of Archimedean jurisprudence. I shall have something to say about his own legal philosophy, which was a form of legal positivism. But I shall mainly be concerned about the method that he said generated his legal positivismOther Versions
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Citations of this work
The Institutionality Of Legal Validity.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):277-301.
Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation.Dennis Patterson - 2018 - Ratio Juris 31 (3):260-275.
The social construction of demoicracy in the European Union.Francis Cheneval & Kalypso Nicolaidis - 2017 - European Journal of Political Theory 16 (2):235-260.
Law is not (best considered) an essentially contested concept.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2011 - International Journal of Law in Context 7:209-232.
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