Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation

Ratio Juris 31 (3):260-275 (2018)
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Abstract

Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.

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10.1111/raju.12216

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Citations of this work

Legality’s Law’s Empire.Nevin Johnson - 2020 - Law and Philosophy 39 (3):325-349.
Common ground and grounds of law.Marat Shardimgaliev - 2020 - Journal of Legal Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Ethics 90 (1):121-130.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Mind 88 (350):305-309.
The Concept of Law.Stuart M. Brown - 1963 - Philosophical Review 72 (2):250.

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