An Inverted Qualia Argument for Direct Realism

Topoi 43 (1):211-219 (2024)
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Abstract

This essay extends my “invisible disagreement” argument for Color Realism (2017) to formulate an argument for Direct Realism. It uses a variation of an “inverted qualia” thought experiment to show that successes in intersubjectively validating empirical claims about colors is proof that a nuanced version of Direct Realism is correct.

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Justin Donhauser
Bowling Green State University

Citations of this work

Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2012 - In Ed Zalta, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Quining qualia.Daniel Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & Edoardo Bisiach, Consciousness in Contemporary Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
Physicalism, or Something near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):306-310.
What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy 79 (309):491-494.

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