Doxastic Cognitivism: An Anti-Intellectualist Theory of Emotion

Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):27-52 (2020)
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Abstract

Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 27-52, December 2020.

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Christina H. Dietz
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

Wanting what’s not best.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1275-1296.
Emotions, evidence, and safety.Christina H. Dietz - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2027-2050.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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