Kant's theory of geometrical reasoning and the analytic-synthetic distinction. On Hintikka's interpretation of Kant's philosophy of mathematics

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (1):141-166 (1997)
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Abstract

Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic method is connected to the so-called Aristotelian model of science and has to be interpreted in a (broad) directional sense. With the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments the critical Kant did introduced a new way of using the terms 'analytic'-'synthetic', but one that still lies in line with their directional sense. A careful comparison of the conceptions of the critical Kant with ideas of the precritical Kant as expressed in _Ãœber die Deutlichkeit, leads to the interpretation defended here of Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments within his philosophy of mathematics

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References found in this work

Singular Terms and Intuitions In Kant’s Epistemology.Manley Thompson - 1972 - Review of Metaphysics 26 (2):314 - 343.
Philosophical Papers and Letters.Martha Kneale - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):60-65.
Logic, language-games and information, kantian themes in the philosophy of logic.Jaakko Hintikka - 1973 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 163:477-478.
Kant’s Analytic Judgments and the Traditional Theory of Concepts.Willem R. de Jong - 1995 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 33 (4):613-641.

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