On Epistemic Appropriation

Ethics 128 (4):702-727 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this article, I offer an account of an unjust epistemic practice―namely, epistemic appropriation―that harms marginalized knowers through the course of conceptual dissemination and intercommunal uptake. The harm of epistemic appropriation is twofold. First, while epistemic resources developed within the margins gain uptake with dominant audiences, those resources are overtly detached from the marginalized knowers responsible for their production. Second, epistemic resources developed within, but detached from, the margins are utilized in dominant discourses in ways that disproportionately benefit the powerful.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,486

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-07-01

Downloads
416 (#72,957)

6 months
31 (#117,118)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Emmalon Davis
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

White Feminist Gaslighting.Nora Berenstain - 2020 - Hypatia 35 (4):733-758.
"Epistemic Reparations and the Right to Be Known".Jennifer Lackey - 2022 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 96:54-89.
The epistemic harms of empathy in phenomenological psychopathology.Lucienne Spencer & Matthew Broome - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1:1-22.

View all 54 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references