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In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 231–269 (1994)
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Abstract

There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties, which is to say that certain psychological predicates are true of them. These properties are constantly changing, and such changes are mental events. Examples are: noticing that it is time for lunch, seeing that the wind is rising, remembering the new name of Cambodia, deciding to spend next Christmas in Botswana, or developing a taste for Trollope. Mental events are, in my view, physical (which is not, of course, to say that they are not mental). This is a thesis that follows from certain premises, all of which I think are true. The main premises are.

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Citations of this work

Davidson’s Transcendental Externalism.Jason Bridges - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):290-315.
Introduction.Neil Smith - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (4):377-391.
Anomalism and supervenience: A critical survey.Oron Shagrir - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 237-272.
The disunity of truth.Josh Dever - 2008 - In Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Compositionality, Context, and Semantic Values: Essays in Honor of Ernie Lepore. Springer. pp. 174-191.

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