Abstract

Donald Davidson is known for developing the token-token identity theory of the relation between the mental and the physical called "anomalous monism". According to this view, although each mental event is identical with some physical event, there are no strict causal laws relating the mental with the physical . There are three principles which are central to anomalous monism: At least some mental events causally interact with physical events; Events related as cause and effect fall under strict laws; and There are no strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained . ;I respond on behalf of AM to objections that the view makes the mental causally inefficacious--i.e., that it makes the mental epiphenomenal. Such objections take one of two forms: Given PAM and NCC, since only those properties referred to by causal laws are relevant to an event's being the cause it is, on AM mental properties are never causally relevant, and Given CI and PAM, AM can give no adequate account of either the causal efficacy of mental properties or of the explanatory relevance of reference to such properties. The main response I given is that those arguments which seem most compelling rest on a misunderstanding of Davidson's ontological commitments. In particular, I argue that given the clearly Quinean ontological framework within which he works, Davidson does not admit properties into his ontology. But the charge of epiphenomenalism holds only if we take epiphenomenalism to be the view that mental properties are causally inefficacious. ;There are, however, some objections to AM which do not apparently rest on this assumption. In these cases, I offer alternative responses, pointing out how in each case the objection rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of some aspect of Davidson's view. I conclude that AM is defensible against those objections which charge it with making the mental epiphenomenal