Abstract

In this dissertation I trace the concept of Poverty, and the presumed obligations it engenders to protect those who are in dire economic need. I show how the concept gets recast over time from an essentially benefits based doctrine, to one of a rights based government sponsored program which imposes obligations on the society as a whole. I also display the meaning of the concept of welfare, as it is conceived within various and pivotal time periods and the philosophical arguments which relate to these same periods. Finally, I argue that there is in fact a defensible position which justifies contemporary ethical claims made by economically disadvantaged individuals against any free market, capitalist state. I weave these various and somewhat disparate arguments together into a more coherent whole which documents the various transition phases in popular thinking about poverty, welfare and individual rights. I begin with the public debate over the laws of enclosure which occurred in England, and trace these various arguments into modern times. ;I claim that the state assumes obligations and responsibilities, while individuals also retain rights as well as obligations and responsibilities of their own , whenever an individual citizen makes a formal claim for protection from a market driven economy. In addition the economic infrastructure of any collective plays a seminal role in defining "opportunity" for individuals and groups within that collective. Since this is the case, and since in the capitalist state the market and the government are inextricably associated with each other, a rational, just, and rights-centered justification of social welfare programming can be identified. ;My assertion is that this grounding obligates the state to protect not only those citizens who are unable to work because of some disability, but that it must also protect the so-called "healthy beggar," those who are able to work but who are harmed through the establishment and maintenance of an orderly and functioning free market. Further, I assert that this harm engenders thereby a "right of necessity" which is owed to the individual harmed