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On Russell's Principle of Induction
Synthese 86 (2):285 - 295 (1991)
Abstract
An improvement on Horwich's so-called "pseudo-proof" of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.Author Profiles
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References found in this work
Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making.Peter Gärdenfors & Nils-Eric Sahlin - 1982 - Synthese 53 (3):361-386.
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