A Philosophy of Christian Morals for Today

London,: Routledge (1961)
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Abstract

Philosophers have been sharply divided in attempts to reconcile the validity of the moral distinctions essential to social well-being with the apparent ethical neutrality of the factual world. The failure to find an agreed solution to this problem produced the popular theory of Logical Empiricism, according to which ethical statements are meaningless. This and other kindred doctrines of ethical relativism that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century, are obviously fatal to the Christian belief that there is ‘down here below’ a recognisable Kingdom of God that men were born to serve. In this book, originally published in 1961, the author offer a complete analysis of the nature of ethical perception to show how the two factors in moral decisions – a sense of moral obligation, and recognisable objective ethical values – can both be brought into a single coherent system of truth. He isolates the unique and ultimate element common to all our ethical and moral concepts and presents a clear view that the basic values recognised in a reasonable humanistic morality are embraced in the wider ideals of Christian Love. The purpose is to present a coherent system of moral truth that will, in this scientific age, commend itself to thoughtful people without offending their intelligence.

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