Critical Comments on Laudan’s Theory of Scientific Aims

The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 37:17-24 (1998)
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Abstract

I criticize Laudan's constraints on cognitive aims as presented in Science and Values. These constraints are axiological consistency and non-utopianism. I argue that Laudan's prescription for non utopian aims is too restrictive because it excludes ideals and characterizes as irrational or non-rational numerous human contingencies. We aim to ideals because there is no cogent way to specify in advance what degree of deviation from an ideal is acceptable. Thus, one cannot dispense with ideals. Laudan does not distinguish difficult from impossible goals, making his injunction against utopianism imprecise. It is "semantically utopian" and, furthermore, a prescription for conservatism and mediocrity. Goals often contradict each other or are at least partially incompatible. Since Laudan does not say how to prioritize incompatible aims, axiological consistency is an utopian desideratum. Thus, his constraints on cognitive aims contradict one another. Finally,, Laudan's axiological constraints are too weak and in order to strengthen them, he must invoke without justification some implicit pre-philosophical cognitive aims. This opens the logical possibility of axiological relativism, which Laudan attempted from the beginning to avoid.

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reprint Cíntora, Armando (1999) "Critical Comments on Laudan's Theory of Scientific Aims". Sorites 10():19-38

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Armando Cíntora
Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana

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