Some problems for "progress and its problems"

Philosophy of Science 47 (4):601-616 (1980)
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Abstract

In a recent book, Laudan has put forward a new and provocative theory of scientific progress. In this discussion we shall show that some of the claims which Laudan presents as new, are (or at least can be made into) parts of more "traditional" wisdom. In particular (in Section 1) we shall criticize his claim to have uncovered a new class of non-refuting anomalies for theories. We shall also (in section 2) criticize Laudan's view that a theory may have an anomaly because of conflict with non-scientific theories--as long as those theories are perceived of as rational. Laudan's view of theory-assessment--via the assessment of "research traditions"--is also examined in this section. It is found to be a significant departure from both traditional, and more radical (Lakatosian, Kuhnian, Feyerabendian) alternatives. Finally, (in Section 3), we examine Laudan's claim that theories may have anomalies because of conflict with methodological theories

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Citations of this work

Anomalous anomalies.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (4):618-619.
Making Sense of Non-refuting Anomalies.María Caamaño-Alegre - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):261-282.

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References found in this work

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
Conjectures and Refutations.Karl Popper - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):159-168.

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