Arguably Better: Eudaimonist Virtues of Argumentation

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Abstract

This essay explores a set of attitudes and capacities that I describe as eudaimonist virtues of argumentation. These include an ability to enter into alternative viewpoints, a genuine desire to persuade rather than merely to seem clever, an understanding of human nature and motives, and a recognition that much of what matters most is hard to define and impossible to measure. What makes these attitudes and capacities eudaimonist virtues rather than merely epistemic virtues is that they make possible a way of arguing which is conducive not just to knowledge and truth but to also thriving more broadly. This way of arguing, rooted in empathetic engagement, is conducive to thriving because it calls upon and thus helps nurture forms of insight that can help us live rich and full lives both as individuals and in community.

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After Virtue.A. MacIntyre - 1981 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.
Virtue in argument.Andrew Aberdein - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (2):165-179.
Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics.David Solomon - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1):428-441.

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