Eudaimonism, Human Nature, and the Burdened Virtues

Hypatia 33 (1):40-55 (2018)
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Abstract

This article explores the prospects for a eudaimonist moral theory that is both feminist and Aristotelian. Making the moral philosophy developed by Aristotle compatible with a feminist moral perspective presents a number of philosophical challenges. Lisa Tessman offers one of the most sustained feminist engagements with Aristotelian eudaimonism. However, in arguing for the account of flourishing that her eudaimonist theory invokes, Tessman avoids taking a stand either for or against the role Aristotle assigned to human nature. She draws her account of flourishing instead from the beliefs about flourishing implicit in the feminist and black freedom movements. I examine the implicit conception of flourishing in the writings of two prominent leaders of the black freedom movement—Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X—and argue that Tessman's attempt to avoid the “sticky issue” of human nature is not successful. Tessman's defense of the burdened virtues depends on a particular reading of human nature as does a eudaimonist account of the virtues more generally.

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Author's Profile

Celeste Harvey
College of Saint Mary, Omaha NE

References found in this work

Justice, Gender, and the Family.Martha L. Fineman - 1991 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (1):77-97.
Feminist communities and moral revolution.Ann Ferguson - 1995 - In Penny A. Weiss & Marilyn Friedman (eds.), Feminism and community. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. pp. 367--97.
14. Contemporary Virtue Ethics and Aristotle.Peter Simpson - 1997 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader. Edinburgh University Press. pp. 245-259.

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