Conventionalism Revisited

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 6 (4):410-422 (2012)
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Abstract

Conventionalism in sport philosophy has been rejected as unable to provide a theory of normativity and as collapsing in ethical relativism, but this criticism is rather imprecise about its target, which invites doubt about the legitimacy of the concept of conventionalism described by its critics. Instead, a more charitable and legitimate account of conventionalism is proposed, one that draws inspiration from conventionalism in axiomatic geometry and is able to avoid the counterarguments directed against conventionalism. This new model allows for a number of non-conventional elements of sport, namely the definition of sport and certain central moral norms, while at the same time arguing that normativity in sport is not exhausted by them, which leaves athletic communities with authority over a broad range of norms

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Citations of this work

Formalism and strategic fouls.Eric Moore - 2017 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 44 (1):95-107.
Did Armstrong Cheat?Eric Moore - 2017 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 11 (4):413-427.
Formalism Conventionalized.Eric Moore - 2019 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 13 (3-4):318-333.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
A treatise of human nature.David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb (eds.) - 1739 - Oxford,: Clarendon press.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.

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