One’s a Crowd? On Greenwood’s Delimitation of the Social

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4):519-530 (2013)
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Abstract

In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor in question. I argue that his proposal allows for the possibility of a “lone collectivity” that is unpalatable in its own right and incompatible with the claim that sociology is autonomous from psychology. As such, I conclude that the relevant beliefs need to be held by more than one person

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Marc Champagne
Kwantlen Polytechnic University

Citations of this work

Solitary social belief.John D. Greenwood - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
Group Agency, Really? [REVIEW]Marc Champagne - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (2):252-258.

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References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.

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