Liu Jishan and Heidegger in Encounter

Journal of Chinese Philosophy 41 (3-4):442-453 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper aims to bring Heidegger's thinking of Being and Liu Jishan's moral metaphysics into a dialogue, in order to particularly achieve a more comprehensive understanding of feeling and force. On the one hand, Liu Jishan's doctrine of pure feeling can radicalize Heidegger's idea of moral feeling. Moreover, Liu Jishan's emphasis on the creative character of the metaphysical force might supplement Heidegger's identification of Being as an ontological movement. On the other hand, Heidegger's thinking of Being can contribute to uncover the ontological significance of Liu Jishan's notion of xing. It also helps to see that in Liu Jishan, the mind consists of inauthenticity and authenticity. As a whole, both Liu Jishan and Heidegger share the scheme of “manifesting xing/Being through mind /Dasein.”

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