Weak independence and the Pareto principle

Social Choice and Welfare 47:295–314 (2016)
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Abstract

In this paper, the independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto principle are simultaneously weakened in the Arrovian framework of social choice. Moreover, we also relax transitivity of social preferences. We show that impossibility remains under weaker versions of Arrow’s original conditions. Our results complement the recent work by Coban and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 43(4):953–961, 2014).

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