Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited

Theory and Decision 76 (4):511-527 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper aims to reexamine the axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of social choice. A generalized notion of independence is introduced to clarify an informational requirement of binary independence which is usually imposed in the Arrovian framework. We characterize the implication of binary independence

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Voting methods.Eric Pacuit - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth Joseph Arrow - 1951 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley: New York.
Internal consistency of choice.Amartya Sen - 1993 - Econometrica 61:495–521.

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