The Epistemology of Terrorism and Radicalisation

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:187-209 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper outlines and criticises two models of terrorism, the Rational Agent Model (RAM) and the Radicalisation Model (RAD). A different and more plausible conception of the turn to violence is proposed. The proposed account is Moderate Epistemic Particularism (MEP), an approach partly inspired by Karl Jaspers’ distinction between explanation and understanding. On this account there are multiple idiosyncratic pathways to cognitive and behavioural radicalisation, and the actions and motivations of terrorists can only be understood (rather than explained) by engaging with their subjectivity in a way that depends on a degree of empathy. Scepticism is expressed about attempts to model radicalisation and predict political violence. This scepticism is based on reflections concerning the nature of complex particulars. The implications of MEP for counterterrorism are briefly discussed.

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Quassim Cassam
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

Empathetic Understanding and Deliberative Democracy.Michael Hannon - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):591-611.
Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
Group fanaticism and narratives of ressentiment.Paul Katsafanas - 2022 - In Leo Townsend, Ruth Rebecca Tietjen, Michael Staudigl & Hans Bernard Schmid (eds.), The Philosophy of Fanaticism: Epistemic, Affective, and Political Dimensions. London: Routledge.

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References found in this work

Toward a theory of medical fallibility.Alasdair MacIntyre - 1976 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1 (1):13-23.

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